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The Art of War Under the Constitution
Christopher Rebel J. Pace*
I.

Introduction
War is the great work of the Organization .
cannot be neglected.

. .

. Its study

Sun Tzu,
The Art of War'

On January 17, 1991, for the first time in over two decades, the
United States entered into a protracted military engagement with

another nation.' Suddenly the country was at war, and the federal
government shifted rapidly and authoritatively from debating
whether to enter a war to debating how to win the war. At the same
time, the most hotly debated question of the war's constitutionality
which branch of government, the Executive or the Legislative,
has the power to thrust the United States into war - was, at least
temporarily, laid to rest.
This essay does not seek to revise the controversy over which
branch of the federal government has the right to propel the United
States into war. That controversy has been thoroughly addressed
elsewhere.3 Instead, this essay turns to the logically related, but
largely ignored, questions of which branch has the constitutional
* Law Clerk to Judge Alex Kozinski of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. B.B.A. 1987, Southern Methodist University; J.D. 1990, University of Pennsylvania. The views expressed herein are my own and should not be attributed to Judge Kozinski
or any of my future or past employers.
I would like to thank Thomas Hardiman and Robert Housman for their assistance and
insight. This essay is dedicated to my grandparents: "every generation needs the one before."
1. R.L. WING, THE ART OF STRATEGY 21 (1988). Wing translates the character "bing"
as "strategy." The common translation of this character for purposes of Sun Tzu's work, and
the one used herein, is "war." See L. GILES, THE ART OF WAR (1910); S. GRIFFITH, THE ART
OF WAR (1963).
2. This engagement, of course, was the Iraq Conflict. Congress never formally declared
war on Iraq, but only gave the President the authority to enforce United Nations resolutions
against Iraq. As is evident from the discussion in Part V of this essay, however, Congress's
actions probably served as an unceremonious declaration of war by the United States against
Iraq.
3. See, e.g., Biden & Ritch, The War Power at a Constitutional Impasse.: A "Joint
Decision" Solution, 77 GEO. L.J. 367 (1988); Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers
Act that Worked, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1379 (1988); Javits, War Powers Reconsidered, 64
FOREIGN AFF. 130 (1985), Rostow, "Once More into the Breach:" The War Powers Resolution Revisited, 21 VAL. UL. REV. 1 (1986); Sofaer, The Presidency, War and Foreign Affairs:
Practice Under the Framers, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 12, 36 (Spring 1976).
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power to terminate the United States' involvement in a war, and
what implications arise from this power.
A review of the debates at the Constitutional Convention of
1787 and of The FederalistPapers (the most popular contemporaneous works on the meaning of the Constitution) reveals that, once war
has been declared, only the Executive has the power to withdraw the
United States from an active war. Congress can pressure the Executive to withdraw the United States from war by withholding all military appropriations, thereby severely limiting the President's power
to wage war. This congressional action, however, does not terminate
a war, but only pressures the President into terminating the war; the
ultimate decision remains solely in the hands of the President. This

principle has several implications.
First, once the United States has engaged in war, the power to
reverse this engagement is concentrated and isolated in only one person. Second, for Congress to end a war de facto, it must take drastic
and decisive action by cutting off all military appropriations. If such
action is taken by Congress, the political repercussions of this decision are clear; Congress cannot blame the President for the United
States' failure to win the war. Third, Congress's decision to declare
war is of greater magnitude than most constitutional scholars recognize. Once Congress declares war, a power shift occurs under the
Constitution, blessing the Executive with far greater power than the
office holds in times of peace. As Part V of this essay explains, Congress cannot block this power shift by attempting to frustrate the
constitutional war scheme.
II.

Background: The War Powers Resolution
An angry leader is not a reason to initiate a challenge
... .Anger can cycle back to satisfaction. But an extinct organization cannot cycle back to survival.
Sun Tzu,
The Art of War'

The debates over the Constitution's war powers historically have
focused, almost exclusively, on the question of whether the Legislature or the Executive has the power to propel the nation into war.
More specifically, recent debates have focused on the War Powers
Resolution of 1973, which forces the President to withdraw the

Armed Forces within sixty days after entering them into "hostilities"
4.

R.L.

WING,

supra note 1,at 159.
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or "imminent hostilities," unless Congress (1) has declared war, (2)
has extended the sixty day time period, or (3) cannot meet because
of a domestic assault. 5
A.

The War Powers Resolution Debate

1. Executive Power to Declare War.-Proponents of the view
that the President has plenary power to involve the United States in
war assert that the War Powers Resolution unconstitutionally limits
the President's wartime powers. Support for this view is based on
three primary grounds. First, the President is Commander-in-Chief,
and exclusive "[e]xecutive control over war making has been a uniform practice for 200 years."' Thus, under the Constitution the
President is expected to have the greatest wartime expertise.' It
seems only logical, then, that the President should decide when war
is necessary or into which wars the United States should enter.
Second, the President is the "sole organ" of the United States in
foreign affairs. 8 Because instigating a war (save a civil war) involves
entering into a conflict with a foreign sovereign, it essentially is a
species of foreign affairs. Hence, if the power over the whole includes
the power over a part of the whole, the President's plenary power
over foreign affairs necessarily includes the power to involve the
United States in war.
Third, no clause in the Constitution colors Congress with exclusive control over the federal government's war powers. The original
draft of the Constitution granted Congress the power to "make"
war.9 The Founding Fathers altered this congressional power during
the Convention, leaving in the final adopted version of the Constitution only a congressional power to "declare" war.' 0 Executive proponents view this change, coupled with the President's power as Commander-in-Chief, as "fortif[ying] a broad interpretation of the scope
of presidential authority."" In essence, the change from "make" to
5. See The War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified
at 50 U.S.C, §§ 1541-48 (1988)).
6. Bennett, Culvahouse, Miller, Reynolds & Alstyne, The President's Powers as Commander-in-Chief Versus Congress' War Power and Appropriations Power, 43 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 17, 32 (1988) (statement of Geoffrey Miller) [hereinafter President Versus Congress).
7. See 2 B. SCHWARTZ. COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
136 (1963).
8. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
9. See J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 476
(A. Koch 2d ed. 1985).
10. Id.
II. President Versus Congress, supra note 6, at 24 (statement of William Bradford
Reynolds).
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"declare" consigned Congress's authority to the salutatory role of
publicly expressing the popular support or opposition to the President's decision to wage war.
2. Congressional Power to Declare War.-Proponents of the
constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution (and, by implication,
the constitutionality of Congress as the sole branch able to involve
the United States in war) have persuasively countered the arguments
detailed above. In the course of their response, proponents of Legislative power appear to carry the day. First, these advocates note that
the President's role as Commander-in-Chief is ambiguous, while
Congress's power to declare war is quite clear. Hence, if the specific
controls over the general, Congress's power to declare war denies the
Commander-in-Chief any control over the decision to commence a
war. The President as Commander-in-Chief only has the power to
conduct a war assented to and declared by Congress.1 2
Second, proponents of Legislative power admit that the Executive, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, is indeed the "sole organ"
of the nation in foreign affairs.1 3 However, in the same case that
described the President as the "sole organ," the Supreme Court emphasized that the President has control over foreign affairs only in
accordance with the declared will of Congress.' 4 Accordingly, while
Congress may not meddle in the minute details and decisions of how
United States foreign affairs will be conducted, Congress does retain
authority over the national policy decisions that are related to
United States foreign affairs. The decision whether to engage in a
war is the type of large national policy issue relating to foreign affairs over which Congress has authority. Thus, the President, even
when acting as America's sole organ for foreign affairs, cannot legislate national policy by declaring war without congressional assent.
Third, proponents of Legislative power argue that Executive advocates misconstrue the Constitutional Convention's decision to give
Congress the power to "declare" war but not to "make" war. Two
reasons existed for this change, and neither one supports the view
that the President should have the power to commence war. The first
reason was that Congress is ill-suited, because of its size, to make
12. See Ely, supra note 3, at 1387 n.32.
13. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936); see
also Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TEX. L. REV. 833, 862-66
(1972).
14. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319-20.
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the daily decisions necessary to wage a war effectively. 15 Hence, the
change from "make" to "declare" was to emphasize that Congress
decides whether to go to war, but once the country is involved in a
war, the President decides how to fight it. 6 The second reason for
the change was to reserve for the President the power to repel sud7
den attacks without first conferring with Congress.1
B.

The Key to the Debate

As is evident from the War Powers Resolution debate, the key
to understanding the allocation of war powers under the Constitution
rests on understanding the Founding Fathers' decision to change
Congress's power from "to make war" to "to declare war." If the
change was meant to remove Congress from consideration of the
propriety of war, or to more closely equate Congress's power to assess war with the President's power, proponents of Executive power
have a strong case for the President's power to instigate war. After
all, if the power to declare war does not clearly give Congress the
exclusive power to commence a war, then the President, with his military and foreign affairs expertise, seems at least as capable as Congress to decide whether to wield the United States' military might
against a foreign sovereign.
On the other hand, if the change from "make" to "declare"
simply separated the decision of whether to commence war from the
decision of how to wage war once commenced, proponents of Legislative power can boldly assert that only Congress's power to declare
war can propel the United States in war. The President's powers as
Commander-in-Chief and as sole organ of the nation in foreign affairs does not change this result. Instead, these powers merely reemphasize Executive control over the waging of war.
The debate over the War Powers Resolution will continue for
some time. For the purpose of this essay, however, resolving the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution is unnecessary. The arguments for and against the Resolution are presented only to serve
as a necessary framework for the focal question of this essay: which
branch can withdraw the United States from war?
15. See Ely, supra note 3, at 1387.
16. See id.
17. See Biden & Ritch, supra note 3, at 374.
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The Forgotten Constitutional Debate
Leaders are those who protect the organization. If the protection is complete, the organization will be strong. If the protection is flawed, the organization will be vulnerable.
Sun Tzu,
The Art of War' 8

A.

The Peace Debate

The record of the Constitutional Convention session on Congress's power to declare war supports the views of proponents of Legislative power that the power to declare is the power to commence. 19
Largely ignored by these proponents, presumably because it was not
relevant to their immediate concerns, is the fact that there were
three reasons for the change in the Constitution from "make" to
"declare." The first two reasons, as noted previously, were to keep
Congress out of the daily operations of war and to allow the President to repel sudden attacks. The third, forgotten reason was to
make clear that only the Executive had the power to withdraw the
United States from war.20
James Madison, the unofficial Secretary to the Convention, recorded that the delegates believed the change to "declare war" clarified the limited role of Congress once war began:
M. Elsworth. [T]here is a material difference between the cases
of making war and making peace. It sh[ould] be more easy to
get out of war, than into it. War also is a simple and overt declaration. [P]eace attended with intricate & secret negotiations.
M. Mason was ag[ainst] giving the power of war to the Executive, because not safely to be trusted with it; or to the Senate,
because not so construed as to be entitled to it. He was for clogging rather than facilitating war; but for facilitating peace. He
preferred "declare" to "make."
On the motion to insert declare - in place of make, it was
21
agreed to.

The above quoted discussions, which were the last discussions
before the final vote on the language change, evidence a belief that
once begun, war was best terminated by an act of the Executive. It is
nearly impossible to envision "intricate & secret" negotiations be18.
19.

R.L.

WING, supra note I, at 49.
J. MADISON, supra note 9, at 475-76.

20. Id. at 476.
21. Id. (emphasis in original).
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tween the whole of Congress and the leader of a foreign nation.
Moreover, "clogging" the instigation of war is performed by vesting
such a decision in a large body (Congress) forced to reach a collective judgment; "facilitating" the ending of war is accomplished by
vesting this decision in one person (the President) who need not consult with others over the decision. Finally, recognizing the President
as the sole conductor of war re-enforces leaving the decision to
choose peace to the President. In devising military strategies, the
President can coordinate these strategies with designs for and negotiations over peace.
If any question remained after the vote on the change from
"make" to "declare" regarding which branch controlled the war-termination process, the question was resolved only seconds later. Immediately following the "declare" vote, Delegate Butler "moved to
give the Legislative power of peace, as they were to have that of
war." 2 However, this motion to add "and peace" to the clause "to
declare war" was rejected by a unanimous vote.23
B.

The Ratification Debates

The sparse Constitutional Convention discussion summarized
above is virtually the sole contemporary debate on the subject of war
termination powers. During the ratification process, the arguments
for and against the Constitution focused much more on the division
of military powers between the States and the federal government. 24
When the exchanges did turn to the issue of Legislative versus Executive authority over war, the focus was not on which branch could
terminate a war, but on which branch could commence a war.2 5
Nonetheless, the ratification process indirectly shed some light
on the power to terminate war. To understand the illumination provided by the ratification process, one must first understand three basic propositions. First, the federalists, who carried the day on most
issues arising at the Constitutional Convention, repeatedly stressed
the Executive's war-engagement powers. The Executive clearly was
to have "the direction of the common strength." 26 Moreover, the fed22. Id. at 477.
23. See id.
24. See Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81
YALE L.J. 672, 683 (1972).
25. See THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 69, at 418 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)
[hereinafter THE FEDERALIST]; 2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 528 (statement of James Wilson) (J. Elliot ed.
1888) [hereinafter 2 DEBATES].
26. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 25, No. 74, at 447 (A. Hamilton).

95

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

SPRING

1991

eralists distinguished the President's role as Commander-in-Chief
from the King's power as military commander only to the extent that
the President cannot declare war or raise an army.17 The federalists,
in short, painted a portrait of the President as highly authoritative in
times of war. Indeed, they even confessed that "[ilt is of the nature
of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative
authority."2
Second, the classic Executive models of which the American
colonists would be aware were kings and governors. As many citizens
knew, kings were blessed with the full power to wage war whenever
and for as long as they desired (absent, that is, a lack of military
funding or military personnel). 29 Likewise, state governors usually
were in near-absolute control over the decision of how and when to
employ their State's military. 30 The limited recorded discussions of
the President's war powers usually analogized these war powers with
the military powers of kings and governors. 1 Accordingly, it is not
unreasonable for the American citizenry to equate the President's
war powers with those of kings and governors, except when explicitly
altered by the text of the Constitution.
Third, the Constitution vests in Congress numerous, specific
powers relating to the military.3 2 But the Constitution does not mention any legislative authority to terminate war or to declare peace.
The logical conclusion, therefore, is that the Framers intentionally
omitted the power to terminate war from Congress's enumerated
powers.
Properly juxtaposing the above three propositions leads to an
interesting result. Popular writings during the ratification period portrayed the President to be at his pinnacle of power in war. 33 Knowledge about the powers of the chief executives of other governments
reinforced this image. Taken together, these two propositions lead to
27.
28.

See id., No. 69, at 418 (A. Hamilton).
Id., No. 8, at 68 (A. Hamilton).
29. See I W. BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES 249-50; J. DELOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF
ENGLAND 48 (1775).
30.
31.

See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 25, No. 69, at 418 (A. Hamilton).
See id.; see also THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CON-

VENTION DEBATES 211, 214 (R. Ketcham ed. 1986) (speech of Patrick Henry before the Virginia Ratifying Convention on June 7, 1788).
32. These powers include the power to "raise and support Armies," U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8, cl.12; to "provide and maintain a Navy," id., cl.13; to "make Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," id., cl.14; to "call[] forth the Militia" for
enumerated purposes, id., cl.15; to govern the Militia called into national service pursuant to
an Act of Congress, see id., cl.16; to "make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water,"
id., cl.11;to "grant letters of Marque and Reprisal," id.; and, of course, to "declare War." Id.
33. See supra notes 26-28.
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the logical conclusion that the President is the residual claimant of
any war-related powers not elsewhere delegated in the Constitution.
Analysis of the Constitution reveals no allocation of the power to
terminate war. Thus, this "residual" power is left to the President.
C.

The Treaty Process

One counter-argument to assertions of presidential war-termination power is that at the time of the constitutional debates, countries
frequently entered "treaties of peace" with other countries. Hence,
the Framers may have intended that the power to terminate war
would be part and parcel of the treaty process, and this process at
least would involve the Senate as well as the President. Such an argument, however, is misplaced and apparently has not been strongly
34
advocated by any of the war powers commentators.
The Founding Fathers actually addressed the subject of peace
treaties, and for one day the working draft of the Constitution had a
special provision for the treatment of peace treaties. On September
7, 1787, the Constitutional Convention delegates amended the draft
constitution to allow "the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate [to] have the power to make Treaties, [b]ut no
treaty except treaties of peace shall be made without the consent of
two thirds of the members present.""5
On September 8, 1787, the phrase "except treaties of peace"
was deleted from the draft constitution.36 The reasons for the addition and then deletion of this phrase are unclear. Some commentators have implied that the debates on these changes indicate a belief
by Convention delegates that the power to end war is coextensive
with the power to enter a treaty of peace, which requires both presidential and senatorial approval.37 A review of the September 7 and 8
debate on peace treaties, however, reveals no such conclusion. In
fact, on the same day that the "except for treaties of peace" amendment was adopted, the delegates rejected an amendment to the
Treaty Clause allowing "a concurrence of two thirds of the Senate to
'38
make treaties of peace, without the concurrence of the President.
34. For a discussion of the treaty power in its proper perspective, see Note, A Defense of
the War Powers Resolution, 93 YALE L. 1330 (1984).
35. See J. MADISON, supra note 9, at 599-600.
36. See id. at 602-03.
37. See, e.g., Partsch, Remnants of War as a Legal Problem in the Light of the Libyan
Case, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 386, 386 (1984); Comment, Illumination or Elimination of the
"Zone of Twilight"? Congressional Acquiescence and Presidential Authority in Foreign Affairs, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 103 n.39 (1982).
38. J. MADISON, supra note 9, at 599.
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This amendment was advanced to address the fear that "[t]he President . . .would necessarily derive so much power and importance

from a state of war that he might be tempted, if authorized, to impede a treaty of peace." 39 Nonetheless, the amendment was voted
down, eight votes to three. 0
Furthermore, peace treaties, which often govern the conditions
relating to the cessation of hostilities, are prospective in nature and
regulate relations between the nation-parties subsequent to the end
of hostilities.41 Peace treaties are much more than a device for terminating war; they also establish positive rights and duties between the
nation-parties. Because these treaties bind the United States into the
future, their substantive provisions (other than a provision terminating an on-going war) require Senate approval as do the provisions of
all other treaties.42
Finally, the manner in which the power to create a treaty of
peace limits the President's power to terminate a war is unclear considering the operational limits of the treaty process. The President
must choose in the first instance to enter into a peace treaty to end a
war. If the President chooses instead to continue the war, then the
President simply refuses to present the Senate with any treaty of
peace. On the other hand, if the President wishes to cease hostilities,
the President can disengage from the war. Neither the Constitution
nor the foreign relations practices prevalent at the time of ratification indicate that the Executive could not halt combat absent a formal peace treaty. Thus, the treaty process, as adopted and ratified,
would seem totally ineffective as a mechanism for involving the Legislature in the decision to terminate war.
IV.

Congress's De Facto Control Over Terminating War
They attack when the opponent is unprepared'and appear
where least expected. This is the Warrior's way of triumph. It
must not be discussed beforehand.

Sun Tzu,
The Art of War"3

Having established that only the President holds the constitu39. Id.
40. See id. at 600.
41. See DE Lupis. THE LAW OF WAR 188 (1987); see also Treaty of Versailles, reprinted in 13 ALIJ SuPP. 151 (1919).
42. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 25, No. 75, at 450-51 (A. Hamilton).
43. R.L. WING, supra note 1,at 25.
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tional power to terminate a war, the next inquiry is whether Congress can exercise effective control over the President's decision of
when to terminate a war, thereby giving Congress a de facto power
to terminate war.
A.

Congress's Military Powers
Congress has several enumerated powers relating to the defense

of the nation."" At first blush many of these powers would appear to
give Congress ample de facto power to terminate an on-going war.
This conclusion is surprisingly deceptive, however, because the actual scope of Congress's military powers is more limited.
Because of the broad powers held by the President during times
of war,' 5 it seems prudent to construe narrowly Congress's military

powers in times of war (regardless of the Necessary and Proper
Clause). A narrow construction of Congress's wartime military pow-

ers secures the President in his ability to manage a war without undue and constitutionally-unwarranted interference from Congress."6
Indeed, the very structure of the Constitution supports a narrow

construction of Congress's wartime military powers. Most congressional powers are broadly defined, such as the powers "[t]o lay and
collect [t]axes,' 7 "[t]o borrow [m]oney on the credit of the United

States,"' 8 and "[t]o regulate [c]ommerce."'

9

In contrast, the Consti-

tution spells out Congress's military powers more specifically; these
consist of a number of more finite, direct powers. 50 Congress does
not have an all-encompassing military power, such as to make or
wage war or to provide for the national defense. 5
Considering this narrow construction doctrine and the specific
44. See supra note 32.
45. See supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
46. Under the Articles of Confederation, the Continental Congress once attempted to
manage and command a military conflict involving the United States. The results of Congress's command were, to say the least, disastrous; to say the most, embarrassing. See President Versus Congress. supra note 6, at 40 (statement of Charles Bennett); Miller, Independent
Agencies, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 41, 67-71.
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
48. Id., cl. 2.
49. Id., cl. 3.
50. See supra note 32.
51. The colonists' concern over of the new federal government's military prowess probably led the Founding Fathers to be more precise in defining Congress's military powers. Nevertheless, it is indisputable that the federal government was to possess as much power as necessary in times of war to protect the nation and national interests. See THE FEDERALIST, supra
note 25, No. 23, at 153-54 (A. Hamilton). Thus, the federal government's power to wage and
win wars is plenary, even though Congress's military powers are not. The gap between the
federal government's military powers and Congress's military power must be filled by the military residual claimant, the Chief Executive. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
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congressional military powers, few powers give Congress any claim
to de facto control over the decision to terminate a war. Indeed, only
three of Congress's military powers give colorable claim to a de facto
control over terminating war. The first power, "[t]o make [riules for
the [g]overnment and [riegulation of the land and naval [f]orces,"
could be construed to give Congress power to control the movement
of the United States Armed Forces in hostilities. 2 Such interpretation seems unlikely, however, because of the narrow construction
doctrine for Congress's military powers. A reading of the "government and regulation" power broad enough to give Congress control
over troop movement would render the Commander-in-Chief clause
meaningless, a result hardly intended by the Constitution.
The remaining two military power clauses, which give Congress
power "to raise and support [a]rmies" 53 and "[t]o provide and maintain a [n]avy, ' ' 54 do give Congress some control over the duration of
war, though again the narrow construction doctrine limits the scope
of these powers. Under Congress's powers to support the army and
maintain the navy, Congress could choose to limit appropriations to
the military. Eventually, this would lead the President to halt his
military campaign due to lack of weapons or lack of bodies to use
the weapons.
Two considerations limit the effectiveness of these congressional
powers to serve as a surrogate to the power to terminate a war. First,
even if Congress eliminates further military appropriations and halts
the drafting of more men into the Armed Forces, the President still
can continue the battle with the forces and weapons remaining. This
is an especially strong consideration following a declaration of war
by Congress, after which Congress is likely to increase the size of the
Armed Forces and the United States' stockpile of military weapons.
Second, during wartime Congress cannot re-appropriate funds
already designated for the military, de-enlist troops already drafted
into the military, or reclaim military hardware given the Armed
Forces. If it could do so, then it could halt a war simply by passing
legislation (and overriding the sure-fire presidential veto) that
removes from the military all of its men and might. The narrow construction doctrine, however, prohibits such congressional action in
times of war. As has been emphasized, the Executive is vested with
the power to wage war and is granted broad authority during war52.
53.
54.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
Id., cl. 12.
Id., cl. 13.
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time to control the use and command of the Armed Forces. Once
Congress declares war, it transfers to the President some of its
peacetime constitutional control over the course of the nation. Part
of the transfer involves the loss of Congress's ability to withdraw
committed military resources from the President. This loss of congressional power assures that the President has a protective buffer
from legislative second-guessing of the President's military
strategies.
B.

The Impeachment Power

Another way Congress can exert authority to terminate a war is
through the exercise of its power to impeach the President; that is,
Congress can impeach the President for refusing to terminate a
war. 56 However, absent such factors as the President's refusal to terminate based on treason or bribery, Congress would have difficulty
sustaining impeachment. If the President alone retains the constitutionally-granted power to decide when to terminate war, the President's exercise of that power raises no grounds for impeachment.
The only exception might occur if the President severely abuses this
power, such as by repeatedly terminating states of war immediately
following congressional declarations of war.
V.

Congress's Power to Declare War
Those who triumph because they are skilled in conflict are
not honored for cleverness or credited for heroism. They triumph during conflict because they have made no errors.
Sun Tzu,
56
The Art of War

A.

The Principle of Unceremonious Declaration

What has emerged at this point is a power struggle between the
Executive and Legislative branches over who controls the military
during war. That power struggle could be subject to a disturbing
abuse, stemming from Congress's ability to frustrate the constitutional scheme of war by refusing to declare war formally. Congress's
refusal would frustrate the war powers scheme because the President's extensive powers over conducting war and guiding the United
States during war arise only following a declaration of war. More55.
56.

See U.S. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2 & 3; id. art. 2, § 4.
R.L. WING, supra note I, at 61.
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over, the narrow construction doctrine of Congress's military powers
vis-a-vis the Executive is more compelling during war because of the
increased authority and discretion granted to the wartime Executive
57
by the Constitution.
By refusing to declare war formally, Congress could retain
much of its control over the United States Armed Forces during a

protracted military conflict. For example, Congress could manipulate
military appropriations to limit or extend United States involvement
in armed hostilities. Congress could also regulate the deployment of
military forces by conditioning appropriations to being used only for
specified military operations. Finally, Congress could impeach the
President for continuing to engage in armed hostilities absent Congress's consent, based on the ground that the President exceeded his

constitutional authority by attempting to declare war himself.
To check such congressional abuse, the Constitution is supported by an unceremonious declaration of war principle. Under this
principle, certain congressional military actions could evince an unceremonious declaration of war on another sovereign in appropriate

situations.5 8 This unceremonious declaration would trigger the shift
of war powers from Congress to the President.

Constitutional law rarely recognizes the unceremonious exercise
of power by Congress, whereby Congress exercises its power without

a formal and express intention. Two considerations, however, favor
the unceremonious declaration principle in this context. The first

consideration was expressed above - absent an unceremonious declaration principle, Congress could frustrate the constitutional scheme
of war.
The second consideration is based on contemporaneous practice
at the time of the Constitutional Convention. By 1781, formal denunciations of war had fallen into misuse.5 9 One sovereign "officially" declared war on another simply by attacking the other sover57. There is a difference between the Executive's increased authority and increased discretion during war. The Executive's increase authority refers to the assumption of more powers under the Constitution during war than during peace. The Executive's increased discretion
refers to the greater latitude in the exercise of Executive powers during war. For example,
those who claim that the Federal Bureau of Investigation attempts to assume more authority
during war to take measures to safeguard the nation's interests are simply wrong. The FBI
may have greater constitutional authority to enforce the law during war, but it rarely exercises
such additional authority. Instead, the FBI recognizes, and acts according to, its increased
discretion granted during war in its pursuit of law enforcement. This increased discretion
arises as a result of the nation's magnified, compelling interest in national security and domestic safety during wartime.
58. See infra text preceding note 69.
59. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 25, No. 25, at 165 (A. Hamilton).
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eign.6 ° The Constitution's ratifiers, therefore, probably did not think
that a salutary formal declaration of war would be a necessary prerequisite to involving the United States in war. More likely, they
simply believed that Congress should have the power to declare war
because Congress, not the Executive, should decide whether involv-

ing the United States in enduring hostilities with another sovereign
would best serve national policy. 6 1 This congressional policy decision

could be made without the formal declaration of war, although such
a declaration would be conclusive evidence.
B.

The Plain Meaning of "Declare"

A plain textual reading of the Constitution also supports the
doctrine of an unceremonious declaration of war. Indeed, this essay's
extensive development of the premises underlying the unceremonious
declaration principle would be unnecessary if reliance could be
placed simply on the Constitution's plain meaning.62 Unfortunately,
60. See G. MARTENS, SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS FOUNDED IN THE TREATIES
AND CUSTOMS OF THE MODERN NATIONS OF EUROPE 274-75 (W. Cobbett trans. 1795).
61. See Biden & Ritch, supra note 3, at 374.
62. The "plain meaning" approach to interpreting terms used in the Constitution involves several layers of analysis. First, a contextual reading of the Constitution must be used to
attempt to define the term in question. For example, the terms "just" and "free" are highly
ambiguous, but they are less ambiguous when read in light of their context (that is, "just
compensation" and "free exercise"). Even unconnected passages of the Constitution must be
scrutinized for meaning. Hence, an interpretation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition from
"cruel and unusual punishment" as barring capital punishment per se is hardly defensible,
given that under the Fifth Amendment, adopted at the same time, capital punishment is thrice
contemplated. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless . . .";"nor shall any person be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .
"nor be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law . . .").
Second, once the term in question is appropriately limited by reading it in light of the rest
of the Constitution, the common meaning of the term must be found by uncovering the common usage of the term at the time it was adopted. Thus, terms such as "establishment" and
"protection" can be given effect by ascertaining their commonly-understood definitions at the
time of adoption.
Third, if a guiding standard has not been deduced from performing the first two steps,
recourse is taken to common practices and assessments of the time period when the term was
adopted. This step, in effect, serves as a surrogate for step two, under the assumption that the
conduct allowed and the interpretations advanced immediately following the passage of the
relevant constitutional provision would reflect the basic understanding of that provision's
meaning. For example, examining the Colonist's common usages of the terms "due process" or
"probable cause" may not lead to a clear guiding standard. However, when examined in light
of practices following their adoption, these terms assume a known or knowable meaning. Cf.
Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 59 U.S.L.W. 4157, 4163 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
Fourth, if steps one through three fail to provide adequate guidance, one turns to the
history of the term's adoption, examining both the federal debates proposing the relevant provision and the state debates ratifying the relevant provision. Again, this step acts as a surrogate for step two on the basis that the meaning derived from these debates will approximate
the commonly understood meaning of the term in question as it is used in the Constitution. Cf.
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most legal scholarship avoids sole reliance on the Constitution's plain
meaning, so this essay justifies the unceremonious declaration doctrine both by a historical/policy-orientated analysis and by a plain
textual reading.
Plain meaning analysis requires an understanding of the word
"declare." Declare has two common meanings. The first is "to make
clear or evident;"613 the second is "to make known formally or explicitly.""' Obviously, the first meaning of declare may support an unceremonious declaration, whereas the second meaning, by its terms,
implies some type of ceremony or formality.
As between these two meanings of declare, the first is more in
accordance with the text of the Constitution for three reasons. First,
the word "declare" in the Constitution is used in the context of "to
declare war." When the Constitution was adopted, most nations had
abandoned the formal and ceremonious declaration of war.65 Hence,
the term "declare" should not be understood to require the revival of
a practice that has long since fallen from use.
Second, as Chief Justice Marshall emphasized, "it is a constitution we are expounding." 6 Such a directive does not mean that
courts may read into the Constitutions rights and protections not
contained therein, but it does mean that terms in the Constitution
should not be given rigid, formalistic interpretations. In this sense, it
is proper to interpret "declare" as meaning "to make clear or evident," rather than "to make known formally and explicitly."
Finally, a broad reading of "declare" does not conflict with the
narrow construction principle regarding Congress's military powers.6" The narrow construction principle is premised on the fact that
reading Congress's military powers too broadly would render the
Commander-in-Chief Clause wholly insignificant. In short, the President would not be the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
within the plain meaning of that term if Congress had military powers broad enough to allow it to exercise ultimate control over the
United States Armed Forces. A broad reading of the word "declare," however, does not risk stripping the Commander-in-Chief
R.

(1989).
Fortunately, for purposes of this essay, no resort is needed to steps three and four because
the first two steps provide the clear guidance needed to interpret the term "declare."
BORK. THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA

63. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 330 (1985). This definition
dates back to the word's inception in the English language from the Latin declarare. Id.
64. See id.
65. See supra notes 60 & 61.
66. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).

67.

See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
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Clause of its significance. Instead, it strengthens the President's role
as Commander-in-Chief by limiting congressional attempts to retain
control over the conduct of war through its refusal to declare war
formally.
With the most tenable definition of "declare" established, there
remains only the task of linking that definition with the unceremonious declaration principle. Fortunately, the link is provided by a mere
matching of concepts. At root, the unceremonious declaration principle means that Congress can declare war by taking military-related
measures that have the effect of clarifying the nation's policy of aggression against another sovereign. This principle fits neatly within
the parameters of the meaning of "declare" supported above, for the
unceremonious declaration principle states that once Congress has
made clear or evident the United States' intention of engaging a sovereign in hostilities, then Congress has declared war. In fact, to
adopt the meaning of declare as "to make clear or evident," but to
refuse to accept the unceremonious declaration principle, is internally inconsistent. Without an unceremonious declaration principle,
the sole means for declaring war would be a formal declaration of
war, and this would lead to the inappropriate result of defining "declare" as to require a formal or express pronouncement.
C.

Identifying an Unceremonious Declaration

A final question to be resolved is how to determine if an unceremonious declaration has been made. This determination must be
based on the aggregate of congressional military actions; it is not
subject to a rigid formula. Nonetheless, a number of key factors can
be isolated and explained.
The first factor involves the extent to which Congress has exercised its powers to strengthen the United States Armed Forces. For
example, implementation of a draft, special combat appropriations to
the Armed Forces, and adoption of legislation granting the Executive
increased discretion relating to military action are all persuasive evidence of an unceremonious declaration of war.
The second factor is simply the converse of the first factor. Congress's refusal to start the draft or make extra military appropriations in the face of pending hostilities demonstrates an unwillingness
on the part of Congress to declare war on another sovereign.
The third factor is the nature of the hostilities and the demand
that such hostilities places on the purse of the United States. If hostilities break out between the Soviet Union and United States troops
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stationed abroad, Congress's refusal to take steps to increase the military capabilities of the United States Armed Forces strongly suggests an unwillingness by Congress to commence a war. On the other
hand, if the President sends troops into hostilities involving a thirdworld sovereign with little military strength, the President probably
will have sufficient troops and military hardware to combat this sovereign without the need for extra congressional aid. In this situation,
Congress's inaction, including its failure to pass legislation that undermines the President's military involvement in the hostilities, provides no evidence for, or against, an unceremonious declaration.
The fourth factor entails consideration of the duration of hostilities involving the United States troops. If the President keeps the
United States Armed Forces involved in long-term hostilities and
Congress helps maintain this commitment by approving appropriations or otherwise, then once again there is evidence of a congressional unceremonious declaration.
The fifth factor focuses on Congress's impeachment power. A
congressional attempt to impeach the President for engaging in hostilities absent a formal declaration of war contradicts Congress's intent to declare war. Of course, if Congress does not act until after an
extended period of time following the initial outbreak of hostilities,
this impeachment action would be largely irrelevant. Early congressional assistance in the hostilities probably would serve as an unceremonious declaration of war. Following this unceremonious declaration, the President could not be impeached for refusing to terminate
hostilities.6"
This impeachment power, although seldom invoked, should play
a key role in the unceremonious declaration determination. The importance and severity of a presidential commitment of Armed Forces
to hostilities is so great that its abuse is quite possibly one of the
most compelling grounds for impeachment. If Congress desires to retain its control over the war declaration process, then it should be
clear in its actions; few actions would be clearer than beginning impeachment proceedings against the President once the President has
involved the Armed Forces in hostilities against Congress's will.
These five factors do not exhaust the considerations relevant to
the principle of unceremonious declarations. They are, however,
among the most obvious and compelling factors. Of equal importance, these factors show that even absolute congressional avoidance
of deciding whether formally to declare war cannot insulate Con68.

See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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gress from unceremoniously declaring war.
D. Return to the War Powers Resolution
An application of the unceremonious declaration principle can
be provided using the War Powers Resolution. Recall that this Resolution allows the President for sixty days to deploy troops into areas
of imminent or occurring hostilities.6 9 After those sixty days, the
President must withdraw the troops unless (1) Congress formally declares war, (2) Congress cannot meet because of a domestic attack
(in which case the President can maintain troops in the hostile environment until Congress can meet), or (3) Congress authorizes the
President, by appropriate legislation, to maintain the United States'
70
presence in the hostile area.
The first two provisions allowing the President to keep troops in
combat are noncontroversial and largely irrelevant to the issue of an
unceremonious declaration. The third provision, however, goes to the
crux of the unceremonious declaration principle. In effect, Congress's
exercise of its authority to pass legislation allowing the President to
maintain the United States commitment to hostilities would be clear
evidence of an unceremonious declaration of war. Such action would
show that, after time for deliberation, Congress had concluded that
national interests warrant the United States taking military measures against another sovereign. Such congressional action also contradicts an intent by Congress to impeach the President for his decision to place American forces in a, hostile environment. Finally, and
most importantly, this congressional action would be taken under a
scheme devised by Congress itself.7 1 Congress chose, by passing the
Resolution, to allow the President to send troops into a hostile environment for up to sixty days. Congress also chose to force, after
those sixty days, a policy decision regarding the propriety of the
69. Under the War Powers Resolution, Congress can direct the President to remove
troops committed to hostilities prior to the end of sixty days by passing a concurrent resolution
mandating withdrawal. See 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (1988). However, under the rationale of INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), this provision allowing early mandated withdrawal is probably an unconstitutional circumvention of the Presentment Clause. See Lungren & Krotoski,
The War Powers Resolution After the Chadha Decision, 17 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 767 (1984).
70. See 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1988).
71: This interpretation of the War Powers Resolution's effect on the congressional decision to declare war runs no risk of being an unconstitutional delegation of congressional authority to the President. Congress has not delegated to the President the authority to declare
war. Congress only allows the President to commit troops to hostilities for sixty days and then
to withdraw those troops unless Congress has taken action to permit their continued presence.
Congress's action permitting the continued commitment, not the President's action initiating
the commitment, forms the basis for an unceremonious declaration of war.
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President's actions. Congress even chose not to alter the scheme de-

pending upon whether hostilities were on-going or merely
"imminent."" 2
On a final, cautionary note, Congress's action under the third
provision is not to be considered a per se unceremonious declaration.
For example, Congress may authorize the President to maintain
troops in hostilities after sixty days but only until the troops can be
withdrawn safely.73 Again, the entire situation must be assessed to
74

make the unceremonious declaration determination.
VI.

Conclusion
Hence, only a Brilliant Ruler and an Excellent Leader,
who are able to conduct their Intelligence with superiority and
cleverness, are certain to achieve great results. The Entire
Force relies on this for every move. The is the Essence of War.
Sun Tzu,
75
The Art of War

The constitutional scheme for allocation of federal war powers
is complex and ambiguous. This complexity and ambiguity is neces-

sary given the significance of war; decisions about war simply are not
susceptible to easy, bright-line standards. Nonetheless, the Constitution does contain a scheme for allocating war powers, and all

branches of government must respect this scheme. Such respect implies, if not demands, recognition of a principle of an unceremonious

declaration of war. To borrow from President Bush's messages preceding the Iraq conflict, the Executive cannot be forced to fight with
one hand tied behind its back. The Constitution envisions more than
just the power of the federal government to go to war; it envisions,
and the American people demand, that the government have the
power to prevail in war.

72. See 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a) (1988).
73. Actually, the Resolution gives the President an extra thirty days after the end of the
sixty-day period, if necessary, to withdraw troops safely. See 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1988).
Nonetheless, congressional authorization beyond this ninety-day period to secure the safe withdrawal of troops probably would not evince an unceremonious declaration of war.
74. Incidentally, Congress never formally declared war in the Iraq Conflict. See supra
note 2. Congress's actions during the Iraq Conflict, however, including authorizing the President to use force against Iraq and appropriating special emergency funds to the United States
Armed Forces, probably served as an unceremonious declaration of war against Iraq. Thus, the
media's characterization of the Iraq Conflict as "The War in the Gulf"' was more accurate
than they probably realized.
75. R.L. WING, supra note I, at 171.

